Analysis of heavy fuel oil use by ships operating in Canadian Arctic waters from 2010 to 2018

It is widely accepted that a marine oil spill presents one of the most significant threats to the Arctic marine environment (AMSA 2009; Comer et al. 2016; Fritt-Rasmussen et al. 2018; Prior and Walsh 2018) and that HFO (also known as heavy grade oil, residual fuel, or crude oil) is particularly harmful when compared to other fuels that are typically used in the Arctic today (Browning et al. 2012; Fritt-Rasmussen et al. 2018). HFO presents the potential for harm to the marine environment in the case of an oil spill, and another concern is the amount of pollutants it releases into the air, which can be harmful to both the environment and to human health (Browning et al. 2012; Oeder et al. 2015; Fritt-Rasmussen et al. 2018; Prior and Walsh 2018).

HFO is a popular marine fuel because it is one of the cheaper fuels and is also readily available. Most large commercial ships (e.g., general cargo, bulk carriers, and tanker ships) operate on HFO, whereas smaller ships (e.g., tugs, expedition style passenger ships, and fishing vessels) tend to use more refined fuels such as marine diesel oil or marine gas oil (also known as distillate fuel) (Comer et al. 2016). Distillate fuel is a distilled and purified version of crude oil, and residual fuel (i.e., HFO) is what is left over after this distillation process. Thus, residual fuel is less refined, thicker, and contains more impurities than distillate fuel. HFO can sometimes contain a mixture of residual and distillate fuels, and this is known as intermediate fuel oil (IFO). HFO has been defined by The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as:

…crude oil having a density, at 15 °C, higher than 900 kg/m³; oil, other than crude oil, having a density at 15 °C, higher than 900 kg/m³ or a kinematic viscosity, at 50 °C higher than 180 mm²/s; or bitumen, tar, and their emulsions. (Det Norske Veritas 2011, p. 45)

Studies have shown that “a switch from residual to distillate fuel reduces BC [black carbon] emissions by at least 33%” (Lack 2017, p. 2). Det Norske Veritas (2019) also noted that using distillate fuels will reduce particulate matter and sulphur oxide by 67% and 94%, respectively. Reducing these emissions will have an immediate impact “on shipping’s overall global warming effects” (Det Norske Veritas 2019, p. 19). Researchers have argued that switching away from HFO can ease some of the potential environmental impact of oil spills as HFO is the most difficult fuel to clean up after a spill because of its viscosity (Fritt-Rasmussen et al. 2018). HFO is even more challenging to clean up in ice-infested waters that are typical of the Arctic compared with warmer waters in more southern regions (Niu et al. 2014; Roy and Comer 2017). An HFO spill could have impacts on the marine environment for many years and could present substantial threats to any wildlife in the area (Prior and Walsh 2018). It is important to point out that while researchers argue that the environmental harms of HFO outweigh the harms caused by distillate fuel, distillate fuels also still create pollutants that harm the environment and affect human health (Corbett and Winebrake 2008; Oeder et al. 2015). While distillate fuel significantly reduces sulphur emissions, and some of the emissions of particulate matter (Corbett and Winebrake 2008), some researchers have found that distillate fuel creates a higher soot content that can have harmful effects on human health (Oeder et al. 2015). Thus, in addition to fuel ban proposals, researchers have argued for continued study and technological and policy innovations aimed at reducing particulate matter emissions in distillate fuels (Winnes and Fridell 2009). Distillate fuel is not the only alternative to HFO, there are other alternatives that have the potential to produce less air pollution and decrease the potential for damaging oil spills, such as liquid natural gas (LNG), battery-powered or solar-powered ships, and other types of cleaner fuels (Det Norske Veritas 2019). However, distillate fuel is currently the most feasible alternative for most ship operators in the Arctic considering its availability and reasonable cost (Det Norske Veritas 2019).

As HFO presents a recognized threat to the Arctic environment, many organizations, researchers, and Inuit organizations and communities are discussing the potential for, and implications of, implementing an Arctic-wide HFO ban on shipping. (The proposed ban for HFO in Arctic waters is for use and carriage for use, transportation of HFO as cargo is not included in this proposed ban.) HFO is already banned in certain marine areas around the world, for example, in Antarctic waters, and it is also restricted in Norwegian waters around Svalbard. However, discussions about a potential ban in the whole of the Arctic are ongoing and politically complex. The implementation of such a ban presents some unique challenges for Canadian Arctic communities, as it has the potential to increase the cost of resupply goods that many communities rely on. The Canadian government, Inuit Organizations, and Arctic communities in the region have raised concerns about this potential impact of an HFO ban on food security and food prices and have requested that additional research be conducted and that mechanisms be put into place to limit or eliminate this risk.

In December 2016, in a joint United States–Canada Arctic Leaders’ Statement made by then President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the two leaders made a commitment to phase down the use of HFO in the Arctic (United States–Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement 2016). At the 72nd Marine Environment Protection Meeting in April 2018, Finland submitted a plan to ban the use and transport of HFO by ships in Arctic waters by 2021 (MEPC 72/11/1 2018). This proposal was supported by Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S. Non-Arctic states including Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand also supported the proposed ban. The Russian Federation responded to the proposed HFO ban by raising concerns about the economic impacts and recommended that all possible measures to mitigate an HFO spill should be explored prior to the implementation of a full ban (MEPC 72/17 2018). Canada, with the support of the Marshall Islands, submitted a proposal in 2018 in response to the proposed ban, outlining that the nations’ objectives were consistent with mitigating the risk of oil spills and harm to the Arctic environment, but requested that the potential impacts of an HFO ban on Arctic communities and economies be considered before full enactment (MEPC 72/11/4 2018). By February 2019, when the IMO announced that it would be working towards developing an HFO ban in Arctic waters, Canada and Russia remained the only two Arctic countries that had not provided an official position on the ban (George 2019a). In December 2019, the United States and Norway released the findings of studies examining the potential impacts of an HFO ban on their respective marine areas located within the Polar Code (IMO PPR7/INF.14 2019; IMO PPR7/INF.19 2019). In February 2020, Canadian media revealed that the Canadian Government was set to announce its support for the HFO ban “with certain caveats” at the next IMO meeting to be held 17–21 February 2020 in London, UK. Transport Canada has not yet publicly shared this position at this time (Sevunts 2020).

The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), a multinational nongovernmental organization representing Inuit of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka (Russia), has stated its official support for a ban on HFO that also minimizes the negative impacts that may be present for Arctic communities. During a media interview, ICC (Canada) Vice-President, Lisa Koperqualuk, pointed out “that over 50% of the daily Inuit diet comes from the land and sea. The value of a clean environment and sea ice cover is immeasurable. An HFO spill would put these community values at significant risk…” (ICC 2019, para. 5). Despite the potential impacts on resupply costs, other Inuit representative organizations have also come out in support of the proposed ban. On 25 October 2018, at their Annual General Meeting, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI) also provided their support and encouraged the Canadian Government to ban HFO in Arctic waters (George 2018). NTI is the legal representative of the Inuit of Nunavut and “coordinates and manages Inuit responsibilities set out in the Nunavut Agreement and ensures that the federal and territorial governments fulfill their obligations” (NTI n.d.).

Other international nongovernmental organizations as well as some shipping companies have also announced support for an HFO ban in the Arctic. For example, the Arctic Commitment, which calls for a “phase-out of the use of heavy fuel oil by ships in a timely manner and [to] URGE International Maritime Organization Member States and stakeholders to advance this goal” (The Arctic Commitment 2017, para. 1) was signed by many organizations including the Clean Arctic Alliance, The International Cryosphere Climate Initiative, the ICC, alongside a number of conservation organizations from around the Arctic. Some cruise ship operators have also signed onto the Commitment, including Hurtigruten, Adventure Canada, and Ocean Expeditions. Most recently in November 2019, a 30-member Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) announced that its members would no longer use HFO on their ships (AECO 2019). It is notable however, that many ship operators, including members of AECO, that have come out in support for an HFO ban are not currently utilizing HFO in their operations and therefore will not be impacted (financially or otherwise) by a possible ban.

Not surprisingly, not all ship operators support an HFO ban in the Arctic. In 2017, a representative from Nunavut Eastern Arctic Shipping (NEAS), one of the regional Canadian Arctic shipping companies supplying sealift resupply to local Arctic communities, told media that an HFO ban could increase sealift costs for communities. A Nunavut Sealink and Supply (NSSI) representative also explained that NSSI would not absorb all the increased costs and would adjust the rate of sealift costs as needed (George 2017). These are the potential economic impacts that the Government of Canada raised in response to the proposed HFO ban. It is not clear what the exact costs will be; although, in December 2019 Transport Canada released a report that estimated the increase in resupply costs if a fuel switch from HFO to distillates would occur. They estimated that freight rates could increase between 1.13% and 1.20%, they also estimated that the costs of community resupply products could increase between 0.07% and 1.9%, which could increase household expenditures by CAD$248–$679 per household per year (Transport Canada 2019, p. 12). ICC Canada has emphasized that communities do not want to be, and should not be, the ones to shoulder these costs. Any increase in the cost of goods (food, fuel, other) in the region could have major implications for the well-being of Canadian Arctic communities considering the already high costs and the existing disparities in the region related to health and income inequality compared with Canadian averages (Power 2008; Ford 2009). It is unclear how these additional costs will be dealt with in Arctic Canada if the HFO ban comes into force.

While little research has been conducted on the use of HFO in the Canadian Arctic specifically, there are some detailed studies on HFO use across the Arctic more broadly. Comer et al. (2016) examined HFO use in the Arctic for 2015. They used the IMO’s definition of the Arctic, which would be the area affected by the HFO ban if that were to take place. They found that 2086 ships travelled through this area in 2015 and estimated that 42% of this fleet would have used HFO, and that HFO also represented 57% of fuel used by weight (Comer et al. 2016). The report used data from the IHS Markit ship characteristics database (ihsmarkit.com/index.html) and Automatic Identification System (AIS) data to determine fuel use for each ship entering the Arctic. Another study that examined HFO use in the Arctic was conducted by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) for Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME; a working group of the Arctic Council) in 2010. This report also utilized AIS data to obtain ship traffic information between August and November in 2010. DNV had access to the Veritas Petroleum Services database; this is a private fuel quality testing service that stores information about fuel use. Their findings indicate that 189 of 954 (approximately 20%) vessels operating through the Arctic region through August and November 2010 were capable of operating on HFO (Det Norske Veritas 2011). In the second phase of the study they examined HFO again, this time for a full calendar year. They found that in 2012, of the 1347 unique vessels operating in the Arctic, 28% were most likely using HFO (Det Norske Veritas 2013).

In a Canadian-specific scoping study, World Wildlife Fund Canada estimated fuel use by vessels operating along the northern Northwest Passage route in the Canadian Arctic as well as local traffic among several Nunavut communities using AIS data for the single year of 2016, found that “of the 123 transits mapped, approximately half of the vessels were burning a residual fuel (HFO or IFO), and that the other half used distillate fuels (MDO)” (DeCola and Robertson 2018, p. 8).

Over the past decade, all ship traffic in Arctic Canada has nearly tripled (Dawson et al. 2018) and further growth is expected given increased accessibility and open water season length due to climate change (Smith and Stephenson 2013; Stephenson et al. 2013; Pizzolato et al. 2016). However, compared with other Arctic regions globally, the Canadian Arctic attracts a relatively small number of vessels (AMAP 2017). Canadian Arctic communities are reliant upon marine vessels to provide community resupply (Pelletier and Guy 2015), to contribute to the local economy (tourism, mining, and fishing), and for traditional activities such as subsistence harvesting. There is also an increasing number of mines throughout the Canadian Arctic that rely on resupply, and some use ships to carry mined goods through the Arctic (Babb et al. 2019). The type of ships found in the Canadian Arctic are provided in Table 1.

Despite intense public interest in discussions around a potential HFO shipping ban in Arctic waters, we currently do not have any detailed insight into the temporal and spatial use of fuel types, including HFO use, among ships operating in Arctic Canada. This lack of understanding severely limits a full and evidence-based understanding of the potential implications (positive or negative) of the proposed HFO ban in Arctic waters. Thus, the goal of this study was to reveal the temporal and spatial rates of HFO use in the Canadian Arctic between 2010 and 2018. The study provides new insights on how much and where HFO has been used in the Canadian Arctic over time. The information may be useful in providing context to public and policy discussions on the HFO ban for ships operating in Arctic waters.

The study area for this research is the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) Zone. Figure 1 shows the NORDREG zone in grey. This area encompasses Canadian Arctic waters, including major shipping routes; the Arctic Bridge through Hudson Strait and Hudson Bay; and the Northwest Passages through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (Fig. 1). The NORDREG zone is the region in the Canadian Arctic where vessels report their position and vessel information. It is important to note here that the IMO definition of the Arctic (which would be affected by the potential HFO ban) varies slightly from the NORDREG zone. The Polar Code definition of the Arctic that the IMO uses only applies to ships travelling north of 60°. Figure 1 shows that this would exclude parts of the Hudson Bay that are located south of 60°. For this paper, we have utilized NORDREG data that include some shipping south of 60°. We recognize that this might alter the findings in terms of exact HFO usage in the Polar Code definition of the Arctic; however, it provides more detailed information for Canadian specific purposes, as NORDREG is regularly utilized by relevant federal departments including Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard.

The shipping database used in this study was constructed using Canadian Coast Guard nonspatial NORDREG ship archive data (2010–2018) that was extensively quality controlled for accuracy and consistency (see Pizzolato et al. 2014). The NORDREG data set contains daily reports of vessel locations at 16:00 UTC for mandatory reporting vessels since 2010 (i.e., vessels that are >300 gross tonnes, engaged in towing or pushing another vessel if the combined tonnage is >500 gross tonnes, if a vessel is carrying a pollutant or dangerous good, or towing a vessel carrying a pollutant or dangerous good (CCG 2013)) as well as vessel positions that voluntarily reported their location with the NORDREG zone. The NORDREG data also include an archive with vessel name, call sign, IMO number, entry and exit dates of the NORDREG zone, vessel length, width, and other nonspatial characteristics. Between 2010 and 2018, there were 601 unique vessels operating in the NORDREG zone. An analysis of fuel type usage was conducted based on these 601 unique vessels.

For the purpose of this paper, we examined all fuel types that fall under the broader definition of HFO (including IFO) as described by Det Norske Veritas (2011) (see Det Norske Veritas 2011 for a detailed account of different marine fuels). Determination of fuel types for this study were made using a variety of different methods. Identification of fuel use among ships is challenging as there are no publicly available and reliable databases that readily contain this information—although some pay per use databases are available based on our assessment, even those are incomplete. Our goal was to determine the fuel type, as either distillate or residual, for each of the 601 vessels that operated in the Canadian Arctic NORDREG zone between 2010 and 2018. Residual fuel is fuel that contains a majority of HFO, and distillate fuel is fuel that contains a majority of diesel or gas oil. It is residual (HFO) fuel that is proposed to be banned in the Arctic. There are other propulsion methods used, for example, LNG, but none of the ships in our data set were found to be using these propulsion methods. There are also sailing vessels that may not have used any fuel during their transit of the Canadian Arctic. We determined that their fuel use would have been distillate if they had a motor onboard; however, they may not have used this fuel at that time. Fuel type was determined using the following steps (Fig. 2).

The number of unique bulk carrier vessels has remained fairly stable each year from 2010 until we began to see an increase from 2016 (Fig. 7). When viewing the spatial distribution (Fig. 8), we can see that between 2011 and 2015 the majority of bulk carriers were travelling to and from the Port of Churchill. These bulk carriers were transporting grain from Canada to global markets. The Port of Churchill, Manitoba, closed in August 2016, which is why so few bulk carriers were seen in this area until the Port of Churchill reopened and its first grain vessel left the Port in September 2019 (Franz-Warkentin 2019). The figures from 2016 onwards show that despite the Port of Churchill closing, the number of bulk carriers increased. Figure 8 shows that this increase is directly linked to the increase in bulk carriers travelling to and from Milne Inlet near Pond Inlet, Nunavut, community (most likely caused by traffic related to the Mary River Mine located on Baffin Island), and traffic travelling to and from Deception Bay near Salluit, Quebec (most likely caused by traffic related to Raglan and Nunavik Nickel mines using the port in Deception Bay, Quebec). Figure 6 also shows that the distance travelled by bulk carriers has also been steadily increasing since 2016. In 2016, bulk carriers surpassed tanker ships for the first time in terms of kilometres travelled. In 2018, the distance travelled by bulk carriers nearly doubled the distance travelled by bulk carriers in 2010.

Figures 6 and 7 show that general cargo vessels have fewer unique ships travelling through the Canadian Arctic each year compared with bulk carriers. General cargo vessels overall travel the furthest distance compared with bulk carriers and tanker ships. The number of kilometres travelled by general cargo ships has steadily increased since 2010, whereas the number of unique general cargo vessels coming through each year has remained relatively stable. The spatial figures (Fig. 9) show that general cargo vessels travel vast distances throughout the Canadian Arctic stopping at different Arctic communities, with the Hudson Strait and northern section of Hudson Bay experiencing the highest intensity of this traffic. Many Arctic communities are only accessible by air or sea and therefore rely on general cargo and tanker ships for their annual resupply. The two main resupply operators in the Canadian Arctic are Desgagnes Transarctik and NEAS (FedNav 2017). Between 2010 and 2018 the average number of unique general cargo vessels travelling through the Canadian Arctic each year was 14. This is an important point that we will return to in the discussion section. Figures 9 and 10 also show significant traffic through to Rankin Inlet, Baker Lake, and Chesterfield Inlet, Nunavut, for both cargo and tanker ships, which is likely linked to servicing of the Meadowbank Gold Mine and Meliadine Mine located near Baker Lake and Rankin Inlet, respectively (Dawson et al. 2018; Babb et al. 2019), as well as the recently opened Amaruk mine near Baker Lake.

The number of unique tanker ships and the distance travelled by tanker ships each year has remained relatively stable between 2010 and 2018. Fig. 10 shows that similar to general cargo vessels, tanker ships travel to many different areas across the Canadian Arctic reflecting their annual resupply routes (Dawson et al. 2018), with north of Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait again being the points experiencing the highest voyage numbers. Unlike general cargo vessels and bulk carriers, the number of unique tanker ships and distance travelled by tanker ships has not significantly increased between 2010 and 2018 (Figs. 6 and 7).